THE SELF AS THE PRIMARY CERTAIXTV. I4I 



only an epistemological and not a metaphysical (or 

 ultimate) principle, and that it must not be treated 

 as existing outside of the context of knowledge, nor 

 supposed to exist as a " thing-in-itself." And he 

 does this on the same grounds as Hume, viz., be- 

 cause the " I think " impartially accompanies all the 

 contents of consciousness and never exists apart 

 from them : so it must be a mere form of know- 

 ledge and not a substantive reality. But as we have 

 already rejected Kant's separation of form and 

 matter, appearance and thing-in-itself (ch. ii. ^ 14, ^ 

 12), the real existence of the self is admitted when it 

 is confessed necessary to the existence of knowledge, 

 and the reality of consciousness. And besides, its 

 existence as the basis of knowledge presupposes its 

 existence as a reality. For while the laws of our 

 thought persist, they compel us to admit that 

 operari sequitur esse, and that wliich is Implied In the 

 activity of knowledge must be before it can de 

 aetive. 



It is not necessary, therefore, to linger any longer 

 over Kant's objections to the reality of the Self : we 

 may refer for a further exposure of their fallacious- 

 ness to the criticism of Kant's agnosticism (ch. ii. ^ 

 21), and accept the reality of the Self as the funda- 

 mental basis of all life, knowledge and proof. As 

 the most certain of all things, it Is the Alpha, the 

 starting-point, and it would not be surprising If it 

 turned out also the Omega, the goal of philosophy. 



§ 5. And it Is not only the primary certainty In 

 itself, but also affords us the first firm basis of a 

 criticism of Scepticism. 



Scepticism was based on the disparateness and 

 conflict of the elements of knowledge, on the imposs- 

 ibility of finding a connection between the incom- 



