154 THE METHOD OF PHILOSOPHY. 



differences we can see and partly understand from 

 hypothetical differences which are invisible and in- 

 comprehensible ? Is the mystery lessened by being 

 relegated to the mythical region of the unknowable 

 and imperceptible, and is it not in very deed an 

 explanation ignoti per ignotius ? 



But we shall have abundant illustration of this 

 defect of the method hereafter (ch. vii. §§ 4-14)- 

 At present it is more pleasant to turn from the 

 intrinsic weakness of the method to its intrinsic 

 strength. 



Its great merit is the emphasis it lays on the law 

 of continuity. It refuses to draw hard and fast 

 divisions anywhere. It does not sever the con- 

 nections at the articulations of the cosmos. It does 

 not regard the higher as toto ccelo different from the 

 lower ; it never loses its grasp of the essential 

 unity of things, even though it may sometimes drag 

 what is lofty in the mire. But even in its errors it 

 is not unprofitable. The connections it establishes 

 between the higher and the lower serve to bridge 

 the moats which dissever the continuity of the 

 universe, and will stand firm, even though their 

 architects were mistaken in their ulterior aims. The 

 scientific truths it discovers are so much gain to 

 those who utilize the material more wisely, and, up 

 to a certain point, it gives us pure truth. We need 

 therefore merely pull down certain excrescences and 

 extravagances, and we shall have firm foundations 

 of science and material of inestimable value. We 

 may say then, that the pseudo-metaphysical method 

 is not so much false as insufficient. 



§ 4. II. The abstract metaphysical method, 

 which has been the method hitherto most frequent 

 in philosophy, differs widely from the pseudo-meta- 



