164 THE METHOD OF PHILOSOPHY. 



philosophical predecessors. With the mention of 

 Berkeley's '* spirits " and Leibnitz's " monads " we 

 have almost exhausted the list of philosophical 

 principles which are not liable to the charge of being 

 abstractions, or of explaining the higher by the 

 lower. Aristotle also regarded the concrete indi- 

 vidual as the primary reality (irpoorrj ova-la), and in 

 his practice gives us an unequalled example of the 

 way in which science and metaphysics should work 

 together. Much help may be derived from all 

 these, and in questions of method, especially from 

 Aristotle. 



§ II. But even with the utmost help and in- 

 genuity, our task is still tremendous. Its difficulty 

 arises from two main causes. 



(i) Our imperfect knowledge of the lower. 



(2) Our imperfect attainment of the higher. 



These two causes conspire to make most of the 

 facts in the world unintelligible. We have to ac- 

 cept them as facts for which we can give no reason. 

 Why does gravity vary inversely as the square of 1 

 the distance ? A simple fact like this will defy ex- ! 

 planation for many an age, for it is the lowest and 

 most general of physical facts, and therefore the last 

 to be rendered intelligible from the point of view of 

 the higher. For just as in ascending a mountain the 

 higher peaks are the first to be perceived, the firstj 

 whose groupings can be understood, just as it is noflj 

 until we reach the summit that we rise to a free 

 purview of the whole, and that the Inter-connectioi 

 of the lowlands and the direction of the valleys cai 

 be made out ; so in philosophy we can only catcH 

 partial and misleading views of what is below, while 

 we toil through the dense forest of prejudice, an< 

 can only gain mysterious hints of what lies beyond, 



:hVl 



