I 



WHEN IS A HISTORY AN EXPLANATION ? l8l 



correspondence to the fullest extent, thus becomes 

 a legitimate ideal of knowledge. 



But before describing the fully developed tele- 

 ology of an evolutionism which is fully conscious of 

 its metaphysical implications, it is necessary to 

 return to the question of the value and validity of 

 the explanation of the higher by its development 

 out of the lower, which has been asserted to be a 

 prominent feature, not only in philosophic evolution- 

 ism, but also in its merely biological stage. 



§ 7. In what sense and under what conditions is 

 a history of the development of the lower into the 

 higher a complete and satisfactory explanation of 

 anything ? Is the mere fact that such an evolution 

 takes place sufficient to satisfy us ? If so, we might 

 without further inquiry credit a conjuror, when be- 

 fore our eyes he changes a mango-seed into a mango- 

 tree, or an egg into a handkerchief. It is no^ suffic- 

 ient that a fact should happen for it to be intelli- 

 gible ; on the contrary, many facts, like death, e.g:, 

 remain mysteries although they continually come 

 under our observation. Hence it is not true that 

 a mere history, merely as history, always explains 

 the matter it deals with. In so far, therefore, as 

 historical explanations of things seem satisfactory, it 

 must be because they fulfil other conditions also. 



What those conditions are will perhaps appear 

 most clearly from an examination of the actual 

 procedure of historical explanations. It appears 

 from such examinations that one of ^/iree things 

 may happen to a thing, the evolution of which is 

 investigated by the Historical Method. 



(i) It may be traced up to a point beyond which 

 historical knowledge will not carry us ; we may 

 come to an unresolved and irresolvable residuum, 



