202 THE METAPHYSICS OF EVOLUTION. 



is not A, B is not B, and A (which is a delusion) 

 cannot reach B (which is still more of a delusion) 

 from A. And if our supposed egg was not even a 

 piece of chalk, but an illusive appearance, an ever- 

 changing Proteus, we can not only make nothing 

 of it, but can not even describe what happens. 



In saying, therefore, that the w^orld is evolving, 

 we say that it is in process, i.e., it is becoming 

 somethinor determinate out of something determ- 

 inate. And Evolutionism shares this assumption 

 of the knowableness of things, in spite of their 

 apparent flux, with all description and knowledge 

 of the world, and only goes a step further than 

 I he simplest utterance concerning the world, by 

 being more conscious of all that is involved in the 

 least that can be said. If, therefore, that initial 

 assumption is justified (ch. v. § 2), and if our 

 description of the w^orld as a process is trtte, the 

 world must satisfy all the characteristics of that 

 description. Hence, if the conception of a process 

 involves two ideal fixed points, then if we assert 

 the process to be a real one, its fixed points must 

 also be real fixed points in the history of the 

 world. 



We may infer, then, from the supposed truth of 

 our theories of Evolution that the world-process is 

 a determinate Becoming, proceeding from one fixed 

 point or beginning to another fixed point or end, 

 and that all the events which take place within it 

 are susceptible of having their places in that pro- 

 cess assigned to them as members of a series, and 

 with i^eference to those fixed points. In other words, 

 all things are susceptible of explanation from the 

 point of view of the end of that process, as tending 

 towards, or aiming at that end. But such an 



