208 THE METAPHYSICS OF EVOLUTION. 



for It would be a history in which nothing ever 

 really happened and no progress was made, and 

 this history could certainly not lay claim to any 

 meaning. For In so far as anything new happens, It 

 happens on our planet and falls without the main 

 process, while in so far as the main process Is real our 

 history Is unreal. 



If, then, as has been agreed, we must regard the 

 process of Evolution as the same for the whole of 

 the universe, it must be formulated so as to include 

 the course of events on our earth, and similarly situ- 

 ated parts of the world. It is preferable, therefore, 

 to construe the evolution of elements also in terms 

 of Time, and to regard It also as exemplifying that 

 general process towards heterogeneity which has been 

 emphasized by Mr. Spencer. In this way the world- 

 process will be one and will have a real beginning 

 In Time, and also a real end — in the attainment of 

 the maximum or perfection of that In which the 

 process con,sists. Foir a process cannot go on for 

 ever, but must pass into a generlcally different state 

 of things when it has reached its highest develop- 

 ment. To suppose anything to the contrary would 

 be as erroneous as to suppose that motion could 

 continue when all the bodies in the universe had 

 attained to a position of equilibrium. 



§ 24. Hence we need not hesitate to reject Mr. 

 Spencer s theory of alternating periods of evolution 

 and dissolution. This belief is one of venerable 

 antiquity : it Is found in the mythologies of ancient 

 religions and endorsed by the speculations of ancient 

 philosophers. Hence we may be confident that it 

 is concerned with what appears a real dlf^culty to 

 the human imagination. 



That difficulty is twofold. It relates In the 



