[E world's reality given with the self's. 267 



tlon (cp. ch. vi. § 2 s.f.), and that in the end "T' can 

 no more exist without the world than the world 

 can exist without me (cp, ch. x. § 20). Indeed, even 

 now the content of the Self is given only by inter- 

 action and contrast with the world, or Not-Self. 



But at present this is a mere suggestion, and we 

 must content ourselves with showing that the fact 

 will bear the interpretation Realism puts upon it. It 

 is a mistake to suppose that the only inference from 

 the existence of the world in consciousness is that it 

 exists only in consciousness, and that its existence 

 is therefore dependent on the subject's conscious- 

 ness. For, granting the self-existence of the world 

 independently of my consciousness, it would yet 

 exist for 'jne only as reflected in my consciousness. 

 In other words, the fact of its existence in my 

 consciousness would be the same, whether or not 

 the world were self- existent. Both interpretations 

 being thus possible, there can be no doubt as 

 to which is preferable. Sense and science alike 

 require us to believe that the existence of the world 

 is not dependent on its appearance in any one's 

 consciousness. The phenomenal world and the 

 phenomenal self, to whom it appears, are mutually 

 implicated facts, and we have no business to assume 

 the existence of either out of their given context. 

 And this mutual implication of the self and the 

 world is equally fatal to both the extremes, both to 

 subjective Idealism and to Materialism. We have 

 as little ground for asserting that consciousness is 

 merely a phenomenon of Matter, as for asserting that 

 the material world is merely a phenomenon of any 

 one's consciousness. But a choice is still left be- 

 tween transcendental, or ultimate, and phenomenal, 

 or immediate, realism. 



