WANTED A METAPHYSICAL ACCOUNT OF MATTER. 27 1 



philosophic argument against MateriaHsm, that it is 

 " a gigantic hysteron-proteron " and a logical contra- 

 diction. And the small impression this mode of 

 argument has hitherto produced, might well arouse 

 the most supine of philosophers to abandon the 

 method of sterile and captious criticism, and to 

 bethink himself of an alternative explanation of the 

 phenomenal world. If Materialism is bad meta- 

 physics, what is the true metaphysical explanation 

 of Matter ? If self-consciousness is the primary 

 fact of knowledge, what part does it play in the 

 explanation of the phenomenal world ? What is 

 the relation of Matter and Spirit ? what is the mean- 

 ing of the distinction of Body and Soul ? and what is 

 the function and purpose of the arrangement of the 

 material cosmos ? 



If we remember the primary subjectivity of the 

 phenomenal world, and proceed by the right method, 

 we shall be enabled to give substantially sufficient 

 answers to these questions. And the right method 

 will here as elsewhere be one which derives its meta- 

 physical conclusions from scientific data and justifies 

 them by parallels from acknowledged scientific facts. 



§ 17. In analysing the conception of Matter, the 

 first thing to remark is that Matter is an abstraction 

 from material bodies or things. Things are all indi- 

 vidual and no one thing is exactly like any other. 

 Nevertheless we detect in them certain resemblances 

 in virtue of which we call them material, and regard 

 them as composed of the abstraction " Matter." 

 Matter, therefore, like all abstractions, is an adjective 

 but not a substantive fact (cp. ch. iii. § 15, p. 82), 

 and it is this which justifies the philosophic protest 

 against the materialist annihilation of the mind by 

 means of one of its own abstractions. 



