3IO MAN AND GOD. 



they arise out of nothing, i.e. causelessly. But if we 

 applied these postulates of our reason to all things, 

 to existence as such, they would lead us into the 

 absurdity that all things having been caused, they 

 must ultimately have been caused by nothing. But 

 if this is impossible, if we cannot derive existence 

 out of nothing, then there must be at least one 

 existence which has never come into existence. Such 

 an existence would be an ultimate fact, and the 

 question as to its cause would be unmeaning. For 

 being non-phenomenal, the idea of coming into 

 existence, or Becoming, which is a conception apply- 

 ing only to the facts of the phenomenal world, 

 would not here be applicable. If, then, God is such 

 an existence, such a conception of God satisfies both 

 the requirements of our demand for causation and 

 solves the difficulty which the conception of a First 

 Cause presents, if taken in an absolute sense. 



Thus God is, (i) the unbecome and non-pheno- 

 menal Cause of the world-process — the Creator. 



(2) We saw in the last chapter that God was 

 also the Sustainer, as being a factor in the inter- 

 action of the Ego and the Deity. 



(3) It has been implicitly asserted in our discus- 

 sions of method in chapters v. and viii., that the 

 Deity must be conceived as an intelligent and 

 personal Spirit. For Cause is a category which is 

 valid only if used by persons and of persons (cp. ch. 

 iii. § 11), while personality is the conception expres- 

 sive of the highest fact we know {cp. ch. viii. § 18) ; 

 hence it is only by ascribing personality to God that 

 He can be regarded either as the Cause or as the 

 Perfector of the world-process.^ Lasdy, Evolution 



^ fPersonality being avowedly an Ideal (ch. viii. § 19), the attri- 



