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1 6 MAN AND GOD. 



So, again, to say that God created the world 

 because it was good, is to limit God by the pre- 

 existence of a good and evil independent of divine 

 enactment. 



Nor, again, can the responsibility for evil be 

 shifted to the Devil or the perversity due to human 

 Free-w^ill, unless these powers really limit the divine 

 omnipotence. For if we or the Devil are /^r- 

 mitted to do evil while God is able to prevent or 

 destroy us, the real responsibility rests with God. 



On the other hand, the commonplace suggestion 

 that, if we could see the whole universe, the good 

 would be seen to predominate immensely, depends 

 on an invalid use of goodness out of relation to 

 man. For *' what care I how good he be, if he be 

 not good to me t " What does goodness mean 

 to us, if it is not goodness to us .'^ And besides, 

 it does not answer the difficulty ; for it is still 

 necessary to ask why God could or would not 

 create a world, which was not only predominantly, 

 but entirely good. It surely does not befit infinite 

 power to neglect even the most infinitesimal section, 

 to overlook even the remotest corner, to fall short 

 of making the whole universe perfect. 



But perhaps the most curious interference of 

 human limitations with the course of superhuman 

 action is shown in the argument which sets down 

 evil to the imperfection of Law. It is supposed 

 that by a series of miracles all things might have 

 been made perfect, but that this would have been 

 inconsistent with the divine determination to con- 

 duct the world according to natural laws. Thus 

 evil is the price paid for ' the reign of Law,' for 

 which we have in modern times developed a good 

 deal of superstitious reverence. But the plausibility 



