n n I 



oJO MAN AND GOD. 



If, e.o-.^ the Absolute is realized in the world, then 

 either the existence of the world is necessary to that 

 of the Absolute, or it is not. If it is, the world must 

 either have existed for ever, for the Absolute to be 

 real, and it is absurd to speak of the Absolute as 

 the First Cause (ch. ii. § lo), or the world and the 

 Absolute have come into existence together. But 

 if the Absolute has come into existence, it must 

 have become either out of something or else out of 

 nothinof, for it cannot have originated out of itself 

 before it existed itself. If out of nothinof, cadz^ 

 qucestio ; it is admitted that nothing is the ultimate 

 ground of existence, and that existence is ultimately 

 irrational. If out of something else, then that some- 

 thing and not the Absolute is the real ground of 

 existence ultimately, and the same question must 

 be raised about it, and so on to infinity. 



If, on the other hand, the world was not necessary 

 to the existence of the Absolute, then why was it 

 generated ? If it was generated for any reason, then 

 why did that reason impel the Absolute to generate 

 the world at the time it did, rather than at any 

 other ? Did the Infinite begin to find infinite time 

 hang heavily on its hands, and if so, why did it begin 

 to do so ? Or if the world was generated for no 

 reason, if we are driven to admit that the Absolute 

 cannot be moved by reasons, is not this the most 

 absolute indeterminism (ep, App. § 4), the most 

 complete confession of the irrationality of the world? 

 For what explanation is it of the world to derive it 

 from an uncaused, unprovoked,, and (as we shall see 

 in § 12) impossible change in the Absolute ? 



And even supposing that in some utterly inscrut- 

 able way the Absolute somehow had something to 

 do with the o^eneration of the world, what could it 



