344 MAN AND GOD. 



we should ipso facto stdX^ the whole, and in asserting 

 the existence of the part we should also assert the 

 existence of the whole. And In this way, and in 

 this way alone, we could argue from the given 

 reality of the parts to the reality of the whole of 

 which they were parts. 



And at first sight it would seem as if this concep- 

 tion of a whole was not only logically thinkable, but 

 also actually realizable. But this would be an over- 

 hasty inference. For owing to the discord between 

 thought and reality which at present exists {cp. ch. 

 Hi. § 14; ch. V. § 2), we cannot argue from an ideal 

 of our thought to a corresponding reality. The 

 Real is ''contingent," things cannot be deduced, 

 and facts cannot be demonstrated. At the best, 

 reality is only realizing our ideals, and will not 

 attain to them until the world-process is completed. 



And so It Is not surprising that the apparent 

 examples of such a relation of parts to wholes, with 

 which reality as yet presents us, turn out upon 

 closer inspection to be delusive. All real things 

 are more or less capable of being parts of many 

 wholes, of being wholes that can vary their parts. 

 There Is never any real necessity to regard a thing 

 as the part of any single whole, and hence we can 

 never conclude by a sure and single inference from 

 the given existence of the parts to that of any parti- 

 cular whole. The inference from the part to the 

 whole is always precarious and probable, and never 

 attains to strict and absolute certitude. We can 

 find no examples even in the ideal regions of mathe- 

 matics. There is nothing in an angle to compel us 

 to regard it as the angle of a triangle, or in a semi- 

 circle to prevent us from treating it as a simple 

 curve, without reference to the circle of which it 



