THE IDEAL OF A REAL WHOLE. 347 



and oar data do not compel us to assume any part- 

 icular kind of universe. For instance, we are 

 attempting to interpret the facts of life upon the 

 assumption of the ultimate rationality of existence, 

 but we were in Book I. forced to admit that they 

 might also be interpreted consistently with its ulti- 

 mate irrationality. But which of these two theories 

 about our data is right, is just what we want to 

 know, and what Pantheism does not enable us to 

 decide. To tell us that things may be regarded as 

 a universe by means of the conception of a totality, 

 is to tell us nothing of the least importance, and to 

 offsr us this trivial truism in lieu of a God, is to 

 mock our demand for a reality with the unsubstan- 

 tial shadow of a logical distinction. Pantheism, 

 therefore, has elucidated and explained nothing by 

 applying to the world the abstract conception of a 

 whole ; its Deity is indifferent to the world, because 

 an abstract conception carries with it no reference 

 to any definite content ; its Deity is not real, be- 

 cause it is merely an irrelevant play with logical 

 counters ; its Deity is not valid, because it requires 

 an unwarranted manipulation of its data. 



§ 20. The conception, then, of a whole necessarily 

 inferred from its parts is an ideal and not a reality, 

 and as such cannot guarantee the reality of the 

 pantheist's All, nor affect our belief in the self-suffic- 

 ing reality of the individual existences. And yet 

 it is interesting to observe that, even if it could be 

 realized, it would after all vindicate the reality of 

 the whole only at a cost of concession to the parts 

 which more than compensates them for the loss of 

 their logical self-existence. 



For though it would have to be admitted that the 

 whole possessed a sort of honorary priority, the 



