350 MAN AND GOD. 



and are also limited in virtue of their actions and 

 reactions upon one another. All things are finite 

 and relative, and the relative is relative to itself, and 

 not to an absolute and unlimited nonentity, which 

 must needs be out of all relation to the Real. 



§ 2 1. The preceding sections have shown that 

 the loo^ical orrounds on which Pantheism was based 



o o 



are fallacious and unnecessary, and as it had already 

 been shown to be equally valueless for religious, 

 moral and scientific purposes, every possible basis 

 and motive for asserting its validity has really been 

 disposed of. Nevertheless there remains a strong 

 metaphysical prejudice in favour of Pantheism which 

 cannot be uprooted without an inquiry into the most 

 fundamental question of metaphysics, viz., that 

 whether existence is ultimately one or many. 



If the ultimate oneness of all existence is main- 

 tained, the doctrine is Monisrn ; if existence is 

 asserted to be ultimately of two kinds, e.g., Matter 

 and Spirit, it is DiLalism; if plurality is asserted to 

 be ultimate, it is Pluralism. 



Of these, Monism has maintained a sort of pre- 

 ponderance, because it appeared simpler and more 

 satisfactory to " the philosophic craving for unity." 

 On the other hand, it is incurably pantheistic, and 

 disposed to dissolve away all the distinctions between 

 things. 



Dualism, again, seemed able to preserve the all- 

 important distinction between good and evil, for 

 which Monism had left no room ; but it harmonized 

 neither with the apparent plurality of the world nor 

 with the philosophic demand for unity. 



Pluralism, lastly, had the advantage of departing 

 least from the phenomena of the real world, but it 

 seemed difificult to carry it out consistently. 



