352 MAN AND GOD. 



a great delusion. It does not simplify the under- 

 standing of the world to deny plurality, in order to 

 assert its abstract unity. Or if the One of Monism 

 be taken as the unit of Number, it certainly requires 

 an astonishing amount of simplicity to see any diffi- 

 culty in passing from one to as many as are wanted. 

 For how is it more difficult to assume many ulti- 

 mate existences than one ? One would have thought 

 that when one was given, it was easy to count a 

 thousand. If, therefore, the One of Monism is the 

 unit of Number, the unity of ultimate existence is 

 no simpler than its plurality, while if it is an abstract 

 One, Monism is unable to explain plurality at all. 



And unfortunately, Monism has no choice of evils; 

 it is forced to interpret the One as an abstraction 

 which excludes all plurality. No Monism can ex- 

 plain the existence of plurality: how the One became 

 the Many, or how, having become, the Many can be 

 distinguished from the One. For the One, being 

 the sum total of existence, could generate the Many 

 only out of itself, and however generated, their 

 generation could not serve any purpose, nor could 

 the Many really be independent of or distinct from 

 the One. In whatever way we put it, the existence 

 of the Many must be illusory : they are of the sub- 

 stance of the One, and can neither disown their 

 parentage nor dissever themselves from the One 

 which was and is and will be all things. The Many 

 can have no real existence from the standpoint of the 

 One, and no raison d'etre. For supposing even that 

 the One found the single blessedness of eternity tire- 

 some in the long run, and created a diversion by 

 mysteriously '* pouring itself out " into the world, 

 there was yet no reason why plurality of types 

 should not have sufficed, and this in no wise 



I 



