PLURALISM. 355 



sense and under conditions which would destroy the 

 very fact it is most anxious to explain. The exclus- 

 iveness and self-existence of the Many must not be 

 so interpreted as to make nonsense of the whole 

 position and to stultify the whole solution of the 

 problem of plurality. For it is clear that if the 

 Many were absolutely exclusive and incapable of 

 having any connection or communion with one 

 another, there would ^^ no Many, and no Plurality 

 could exist. Each monad would form a world by 

 itself, would be a One as impervious to criticism and 

 as unconscious of all outside influence as the One of 

 Monism itself. Pluralism would be no better than 

 Monism. When, therefore. Pluralism asserts that 

 the Many as a matter of fact exist, it must be taken 

 to have thereby implied that they are also capable of 

 existing as many, i.e., the- possibility of the inter- 

 action of the Many is implied in their very existence, 

 and does not require any special proof. 



And Leibnitz might well take for granted that as 

 the Many do interact, they must also be capable of 

 interacting, and that it was unnecessary to demon- 

 strate that what actually existed was also capable of 

 existing. He himself was far too well^ versed in 

 Aristotelian philosophy to. suspect that his critics 

 would require him to justify the possibility of the 

 potentiality, where the actuality was obviously 

 given. To such criticism, from the Leibnitzian as 

 from the Aristotelian standpoint, there could be but 

 one answer ; viz., that the potentiality was nothing 

 without the actuality (ch. vil. \ 17), and con- 

 sequently that the One, as the possibility of their 

 interaction, was nothing without the Many, and that 

 the real reason of things must be sought in the 

 Many. 



