358 MAN AND GOD. 



things :; as their perfection and final harmony, it is 

 the highest and last of things ; but it is Pluralism 

 alone that can distinguish between these two senses 

 of unity, which Monism inextricably confounds. 



Thus satisfaction is given to the legitimate claims 

 alike of the One and of the Many, in a higher 

 synthesis which transcends the extremes both of 

 Pantheism and of individualism. Unity (in the 

 sense of union) is admitted to be a higher ideal 

 than plurality, but for that very reason it cannot 

 be treated as real in an imperfect world. For the 

 explanation of our existing world the first sense of 

 the One is irrelevant, as being included in the mere 

 fact of the world's existence, whereas the second 

 is inapplicable, as being not yet attained. In the 

 interpretation, therefore, of our world Pluralism 

 is supreme ; it is the only possible and relevant 

 answer to the ultimate question of ontology. It Is 

 only by asserting existences to be ultimately many 

 that we can satisfy the demands either of the Real 

 or of the Ideal. 



And it' is a mere prejudice to suppose that there 

 is any intrinsic difficulty in the ultimate existence of 

 many individuals ; for the conception of ultimate 

 existence is no more difficult in the case of many 

 than of one. All thought must admit the ultimate- 

 ness of some existence, admit a limit to the question 

 of the origin or cause of existence ; for otherwise it 

 would have to confess to the absurdity that the 

 ultimate cause of everything is nothing or unknow- 

 able (§ i). But as we saw in chapter ii. (§ 5), our 

 thinking faculty, when rightly interrogated, does 

 not require such an infinite regress of reasons, but 

 readily acquiesces in the self-evident, and the ques- 

 tion as to the cause of existence as such is idle 



I 



