3 JO MAN AND GOD. 



The raising of this question is In reality merely 

 one form of asking why we need to go behind the 

 phenomenal. And the ultimate answer to it is that 

 all science and all knowledge, every intelligible view 

 of life, must go behind the phenomenal. Even the 

 most materialistic and unspeculative science must do 

 it to some extent, must form theories of the unseen 

 and imperceptible, in order to account for appear- 

 ances (cp. ch. ill. § 3). And so the philosophic ground 

 for the existence of a God is of a precisely similar 

 character to the scientific ground for assuming the 

 existence of atoms or undiscovered planets. It Is 

 an inference to account for the actions of the appa- 

 rent : we infer the existence of the unseen reality 

 God, just as the astronomer Inferred the existence 

 of the unknown planet Neptune from the motions 

 of the known planet Uranus. We infer it because 

 there is no other reasonable way of accounting for 

 the motions of the world. 



That this is the case will easily appear, if we 

 consider what are the characteristics of the world 

 which directly necessitate the inference to the exist- 

 ence of a God. 



It is agreed, in the first place, that if the pheno- 

 menal world is ultimate, the individual existences in 

 it are alone real, and that it is a superstition to 

 hypostasize their interaction as '' Nature " or " the 

 All." Nature is not a reality superior to the indi- 

 viduals and capable of controlling their destinies, 

 but simply the sum total of their interactions, and 

 all the operations of nature must be explained by 

 the capacities of the known Individuals. Hence all 

 the intelligence, reason, or purpose we discover in 

 the world must be conscious intelligence, in some 

 or other of its real existences. Even, therefore, if 



