thp: argument from moral necessitv^. 387 



in a future life was not an essential part of Christian- 

 ity. And, indeed, they may be admitted to have 

 established that there is no logical necessity for this 

 doctrine within the system of the traditional religion, 

 nor even any explicit affirmation of the continuance 

 of all individuals. On the contrary, the Scriptures 

 contain many passages which implicitly and explicitly 

 deny it, and compare man to *' the beasts that perish." 

 And the positive assertions of Scripture are all in- 

 conclusive. Thus, e.g., no conclusion evidently can 

 be drawn from the resurrection of Christ. For it 

 is impossible to argue from the bodily resurrection 

 of a divine being to the continuance of the soul of 

 ordinary men. If there is one thing certain, it is that 

 our future life can not be similar to the resurrection 



k and ascension into a super-terrestrial sphere of the 

 terrestrial body of Christ. Whatever else we do 

 when we die, we leave our bodies in our sepulchres. 

 Nor need the specific promises of Heaven or Hell 

 made to individuals in special cases be held to estab- 

 lish a universal rule. 



Thus it appears that the traditional religion not 

 only does not give us any serviceable information 



, concerning any future life, but does not even secure 



I us our fancied heritage of Heaven or of Hell. And 

 once this is realized, it surely becomes evident th^t 

 it cannot be accepted in any sense as conclusive of 

 the matter under discussion. 

 § 5. We may consider next two closely allied 

 grounds for the belief in a future life, viz., its asser- 

 tion on the ground of its practical or moral necessity, 

 or of its being a postulate of feeling. These are 

 probably the favourite bases for the hope of immort- 

 ality among those who cherish it, but neither of 



