388 IMMORTALITY. 



It does Indeed at first sound a persuasive and at- 

 tractive line of argument to say that there can be no 

 retribution of o-ood and evil if there is no future life, 



o 



and that the belief in it is therefore a practical neces- 

 sity, if there is to be any reason or justice in the 

 order of things. 



But what if the constitution of things admit neither 

 of reason nor of justice, and hence be unable to recog- 

 nize any such moral necessity? What if things be 

 inherently irrational and perverse ? That all should 

 come right in the end is an assumption we can by no 

 means make as a matter of course, but only with the 

 utmost difficulty (cp. ch. v. § 2), and until It is estab- 

 lished the argument from moral necessity is simply 

 arguing In a circle. And even when it is admitted, 

 as In a sense we have admitted it (§ 2, s.f ), it can 

 never be admitted as an Independent and substan- 

 tive argument. It must always result from a general 

 view of the world, which has previously established 

 Its rationality. And this Is precisely what most of 

 those that make use of this plea neglect to do. They 

 make an appeal to moral necessity, although their 

 systems have left no room for morality, for the dis- 

 tinction of Good and Evil. If, as is the case in the 

 pantheism of the Infinite (ch.x. §io),orinthe atheism 

 of Buddhism, the distinction of Good and Evil Is 

 merely phenomenal and really unmeaning, we have 

 no business to expect from the All any perception 

 of the "■ moral necessity " of bestowing a future life 

 upon us. 



Again, the assertion of a future life as a postulate 

 of feeling seems to require something like univer- 

 sality in the feeling. But not only have we been 

 led to observe phenomena (§§ 2 and 3), which throw 

 considerable doubt on the genuineness of the alleged 



