41 8 IMMORTALITY. 



and nature to some extent ; and if we must assume 

 it in some form to make science possible, why should 

 we not assume it in its complete form, and thereby 

 do away with the difficulties in which our inconsis- 

 tent assumptions involve us ? If cause is a category 

 of the human mind which we attribute to nature, 

 why should we not, while we are about it, attribute 

 it in its complete form as the final cause, in which 

 it is no longer a category which refutes itself? 

 There may be some ground for objecting to final 

 causes from a thoroughly sceptical point of view, 

 which does not admit that the world of appearances 

 is commensurate with our thought (cp. ch. iii. § n) ; 

 but from the standpoint of science, which admits this 

 assumption, such an objection surely strains at gnats 

 while swallowing camels {cp. ch. vii. § 6). 



§ 20. And it would be ridiculous affectation to 

 assert that we are not perfectly familiar with several 

 such instances of double causation. Our daily life 

 supplies abundant examples of actions which are 

 physically caused by one set of persons and teleo- 

 logically by another. The man who publishes a 

 report of the discovery of fabulously rich gold mines, 

 with the purpose of attracting immigrants, is at least 

 as truly the cause of the resulting " rush " as the 

 leg-muscles of the gold diggers. And so every- 

 thing in the nature of a plan, plot, or device for 

 influencing the action of others implies agents who 

 consciously or unconsciously give effect to the pur- 

 poses of others. But the phenomenon can be 

 studied most clearly and unmistakably in post- 

 hypnotic suggestions. It is suggested to a hypno- 

 tized subject that he is to do a certain action on 

 awaking : when he awakes, he has no memory of 

 the suggestion, but executes the order, if it be not 



