DESCENDED FROM ANGELS AND FROM APES. 419 



one palpably absurd and repugnant to his habits, 

 without the slightest suspicion that It has been in 

 any way determined by any extraneous cause : on 

 the contrary, if inquiries are made, he will even 

 proceed to give reasons for doing what he did, which 

 would satisfy every one who was not aware of the 

 real cause of the action in the hypnotic suggestion/ 

 And such examples should make us realize, however 

 much we may struggle against the admission, that 

 our causes are always reasons^ and must be so 

 from the constitution of our minds, and that with a 

 moderate amount of ingenuity a great variety of 

 reasons can be given for any action. It Is therefore 

 a mere superstition to suppose that we ever arrive 

 at the knowledge of a physical cause so absolute 

 that it does not admit of an alternative. Hence, as 

 soon as any considerable Interests are involved, It 

 will always be possible to support them with a show 

 of reason, and the only error of such reasonings 

 often is that they are esteemed mutually exclusive. 



And it is not merely in the phenomena of daily 

 life and of psychical science that we are familiar with 

 the reality of double causation, but no less in the 

 religious doctrine of an. over-ruling Providence, i.e., 

 of an agency which shapes the course of natural 

 causation In accordance with a preconceived purpose. 



^ The evidence for this is not very abundant, but sufficient. 

 But then experiments have hitherto aimed chiefly at establishing 

 the fact of suggestion, and hence the actions suggested have been 

 intentionally made repugnant to the subject, and such as he clearly 

 would not perform of his own accord. But even though the 

 experiments were specially calculated to arouse suspicion as to 

 their source in the subject's mind, the absurdity of the suggested 

 action may reach an alarming height without arousing any sus- 

 picion of an extraneous origin. Cp. Proc. Psychical Soc, vol. III. 

 p. I. 



2 Cp. Mr. F. H. Bradley's Logic, Bk III.,.pt. 2, ch. 2. 



