208 THE SIEGE OF THE NORTH POLE 



As regards the responsibility for the great disaster 

 which overtook this expedition, Greely admitted that, 

 although not under orders to do so, he should have done 

 more than arrange for a retreat to Cape Sabine in the 

 event of not being reached at Conger. But little blame 

 can be attached to him for this omission. It is easy to 

 criticise after the event, but it seemed in the highest 

 degree improbable that, if he could not be reached at 

 Conger, there would be the least difficulty in the relief 

 ships leaving sufficient supplies at Cape Sabine or other 

 point on the west coast. 



The disaster can be traced in the first place to the 

 instructions given to Greely to abandon the station and 

 retreat to the south in the event of no relief ship reaching 

 him. It would have been much better to have left this 

 question to Greely's discretion. If the party had remained 

 at Conger another winter, it is highly probable that no 

 disaster would have occurred. 



In the second place, the chief responsibility undoubtedly 

 lay with those who had charge of the relief. A ship was 

 sent north in 1882, and failed in its mission ; but instead 

 of leaving its stores, or even part of its stores, at some 

 point likely to be reached by Greely, those in command 

 took the incredible course of returning south with the 

 stores intact. 



In 1883 those in authority must have known that 

 absolutely nothing had been done in 1882, and that in 

 the event of a failure to reach Conger taking place in 

 1883, Greely would certainly retreat southwards. One 

 would therefore have expected that all possible pre- 

 cautions would be taken to insure the safety of the 

 expedition. The possible wreck of one of the relief 

 ships should have been arranged for, and steps taken to 

 insure that sufficient supplies would not only be left at 

 Littleton Island, but at some point on the west coast. 



