ULTIMATE SCIENTIFIC IDEAS. 65 



as above said, not presented in thought, but represented; and 

 they must be represented as in the act of occurring. Now to 

 represent the termination of consciousness as occurring in 

 ourselves, is to think of ourselves as contemplating the cessa- 

 tion of the last state of consciousness; and this implies a 

 supposed continuance of consciousness after its last state, 

 which is absurd. In the second place, if we regard the mat- 

 ter objectively if we study the phenomena as occurring in 

 others, or in the abstract, we are equally foiled. Conscious- 

 ness implies perpetual change and the perpetual establish- 

 ment of relations between its successive phases. To be 

 known at all, any mental affection must be known as such or 

 such as like these foregoing ones or unlike those: if it is 

 not thought of in connexion with others not distinguished 

 or identified by comparison with others, it is not recognized 

 is not a state of consciousness at all. A last state of con- 

 sciousness, then, like any other, can exist only through a per- 

 ception of its relations to previous states. But such percep- 

 tion of its relations must constitute a state later than the last, 

 which is a contradiction. Or to put the difficulty in another 

 form : If ceaseless change of state is the condition on which 

 alone consciousness exists, then when the supposed last state 

 has been reached by the completion of the preceding change, 

 change has ceased; therefore consciousness has ceased; 

 therefore the supposed last state is not a state of conscious- 

 ness at all ; therefore there can be no last state of conscious- 

 ness. In short, the perplexity is like that presented by the 

 relations of Motion and Rest. As we found it was impossi- 

 ble really to conceive Rest becoming Motion or Motion 

 becoming Rest; so here we find it is impossible really to 

 conceive either the beginning or the ending of those changes 

 which constitute consciousness. 



Hence, while we are unable either to believe or to con- 

 ceive that the duration of consciousness is infinite, we are 

 equally unable either to know it as finite, or to conceive it 

 as finite. 



