THE 11ELATIVITY OF ALL KNOWLEDGE. 79 



the Finite has not ; for, as no finite part can be a constituent 

 of an infinite whole, this differential characteristic must it- 

 self be infinite ; and must at the same time have nothing in 

 common with the finite. We are thus thrown back upon our 

 former impossibility; for this second infinite will be distin- 

 guished from the finite by the absence of qualities which the 

 latter possesses. A consciousness of the Infinite as such thus 

 necessarily involves a self-contradiction; for it implies the 

 recognition, by limitation and difference, of that which can 

 only be given as unlimited and indifferent. * * * 



" This contradiction, which is utterly inexplicable on the 

 supposition that the infinite is a positive object of human 

 thought, is at once accounted for, when it is regarded as the 

 mere negation of thought. If all thought is limitation; if 

 whatever we conceive is, by the very act of conception, 

 regarded as finite, the infinite, from a human point of 

 view, is merely a name for the absence of those conditions 

 under which thought is possible. To speak of a Conception 

 of the Infinite is, therefore, at once to affirm those conditions 

 and to deny them. The contradiction, which we discover in 

 such a conception, is only that which we have ourselves 

 placed there, by tacitly assuming the conceivability of the 

 inconceivable. The condition of consciousness is distinc- 

 tion; and condition of distinction is limitation. We can 

 have no consciousness of Being in general which is not some 

 Being in particular : a thing, in consciousness, is one thing 

 out of many. In assuming the possibility of an infinite ob- 

 ject of consciousness, I assume, therefore, that it is at the 

 same time limited and unlimited; actually something, 

 without which it could not be an object of conscious-' 

 ness, and actually nothing, without which it could not be 

 infinite. * * * 



" A second characteristic of Consciousness, is',' that it is 

 only possible in the form of a relation. Thjere must be a 

 Subject, or person conscious, and an Object, or thing of 

 which he is conscious. There can be no consciousness with- 



