THE RELATIVITY OF ALL KNOWLEDGE. 81 



solute, as such, is independent of all relation. The Concep- 

 tion of the Absolute .thus implies at the same time the pres- 

 ence and absence of the relation by which thought is consti- 

 tuted; and our various endeavours to represent it are only 

 so many modified forms of the contradiction involved in our 

 original assumption. Here, too, the contradiction is one 

 which we ourselves have made. It does not imply that the 

 Absolute cannot exist; but it implies, most certainly, that 

 we cannot conceive it as existing.' 7 



Here let me point out how the same general inference 

 may be evolved from another fundamental condition of 

 thought, omitted by Sir W. Hamilton, and not supplied by 

 Mr Mansel; a condition which, under its obverse aspect, 

 we have already contemplated in the last section. Every 

 complete act of consciousness, besides distinction and rela- 

 tion, also implies likeness. Before it can become an idea, or 

 constitute a piece of knowledge, a mental state must not only 

 be known as separate in kind from certain foregoing states 

 to which it is known as related by succession; but it must 

 further be known as of the same kind with certain other 

 foregoing states. That organization of changes which con- 

 stitutes thinking, involves continuous integration as well as 

 continuous differentiation. Were each new affection of the 

 mind perceived simply as an affection in some way con- 

 trasted with the preceding ones were there but a chain of 

 impressions, each of which as it arose was merely distin- 

 guished from its predecessors; consciousness would be an 

 utter chaos. To produce that orderly consciousness which 

 we call intelligence, there requires the assimilation of each 

 impression to others, that occurred earlier in the series. 

 Both the successive mental states, and the successive rela- 

 tions which they bear to each other, must be classified ; and 

 classification involves not only a parting of the unlike, but 

 also a binding together of the like. In brief, a true cogni- 

 tion is possible only through an accompanying recogni- 

 tion. Should it be objected that if so, there cannot 



