THE RELATIVITY OF ALL KNOWLEDGE. 89 



swer to x and y and the relation between them. It matters 

 nothing to us if a and l> are like x and y or not. Could they 

 be exactly identical with them, we should not be one whit 

 the better off; and their total dissimilarity is no disadvan- 

 tage to us. 



Deep down then in the very nature of Life, the relativ- 

 ity of our knowledge is discernible. The analysis of vital 

 actions in general, leads not only to the conclusions that 

 things in themselves cannot be known to us ; but also to the 

 conclusion that knowledge of them, were it possible, would 

 be useless. 



26. There still remains the final question What 

 must we say concerning that which transcends knowledge? 

 Are we to rest wholly in the consciousness of phenomena ? 

 is the result of inquiry to exclude utterly from our minds 

 everything but the relative? or must we also believe in 

 something beyond the relative? 



The answer of pure logic is held to be, that by the limits 

 of our intelligence we are rigorously confined within the re- 

 lative; and that anything transcending the relative can be 

 thought of only as a pure negation, or as a non-existence. 

 "The absolute is conceived merely by a negation of con- 

 ceivability," writes Sir William Hamilton. " The Absolute 

 and the Infinite" says Mr Mansel, " are thus, like the In- 

 conceivable and the Imperceptible^ names indicating, not an 

 object of thought or of consciousness at all, but the mere 

 absence of the conditions under which consciousness is possi- 

 ble." From each of which extracts may be deduced the con- 

 clusion, that since reason cannot warrant us in affirming the 

 positive existence of what is cognizable only as a negation, 

 we cannot rationally affirm the positive existence of any- 

 thing beyond phenomena. 



Unavoidable as this conclusion seems, it involves, I 

 think, a grave error. If the premiss be granted, the infer- 

 ence must doubtless be admitted; but the premiss, in the 

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