^94 THE RELATIVITY OF ALL KNOWLEDGE. 



ceive the relation between the Relative and Non-relative 

 without being conscious of both, " we are in fact " (to quote 

 the words of Mr Mansel differently applied) " required to 

 compare that of which we are conscious with that of which 

 we are not conscious; the comparison itself being an act of 

 consciousness, and only possible through the consciousness 

 of both its objects." What then becomes of the assertion 

 that " the Absolute is conceived merely by a negation of 

 conceivability," or as " the mere absence of the conditions 

 under which consciousness is possible? " If the Non-rela- 

 tive or Absolute, is present in thought only as a mere nega- 

 tion, then the relation between it and the Relative becomes 

 unthinkable, because one of the terms of the relation is ab- 

 sent from consciousness. And if this relation is unthink- 

 able, then is the Relative itself unthinkable, for want of its 

 antithesis ; whence results the disappearance of all thought 

 whatever. 



Let me here point out that both Sir Wm Hamilton and 

 Mr Mansel, do, in other places, distinctly imply that our 

 consciousness of the Absolute, indefinite though it is, is 

 positive and not negative. The very passage already quoted 

 from Sir Wm Hamilton, in which he asserts that " the ab- 

 solute is conceived merely by a negation of conceivability," 

 itself ends with the remark that, "by a wonderful revela- 

 tion we are thus, in the very consciousness of our inability to 

 conceive aught above the relative and finite, inspired with a 

 belief in the existence of something unconditioned beyond 

 the sphere of all comprehensible reality." The last of 

 these assertions practically admits that which the other 

 denies. By the laws of thought as Sir Wm Hamilton has 

 interpreted them, he finds himself forced to the conclusion 

 that our consciousness of the Absolute is a pure negation. 

 He nevertheless finds that there does exist in consciousness 

 an irresistible conviction of the real " existence of some- 

 thing unconditioned." And he gets over the inconsistency 

 by speaking of this conviction as " a wonderful revelation " 



