98 THE RELATIVITY OF ALL KNOWLEDGE. 



adding these to the conception, the attributes first thought 

 of lapse more or less completely out of consciousness. 

 Nevertheless, the whole group constitutes a representation 

 of the piano. Now as in this case we form a definite concept 

 of a special existence, by imposing limits and conditions in 

 successive acts; so, in the converse case, by taking away the 

 limits and conditions in successive acts, we form an indefi- 

 nite notion of general existence. By fusing a series of states 

 of consciousness, in each of which, as it arises, the limita- 

 tions and conditions are abolished, there is produced a con- 

 sciousness of something unconditioned. To speak more 

 rigorously: this consciousness is not the abstract of any 

 one group of thoughts, ideas, or conceptions; but it is the 

 abstract of all thoughts, ideas, or conceptions. That which 

 is common to them all, and cannot be got rid of, is what we 

 predicate by the word existence. Dissociated as this be- 

 comes from each of its modes by the perpetual change of 

 those modes, it remains as an indefinite consciousness of 

 something constant under all modes of being apart from 

 its appearances. The distinction we feel between special 

 and general existence, is the distinction between that which 

 is changeable in us, and that which is unchangeable. The 

 contrast between the Absolute and the Relative in our 

 minds, is really the contrast between that mental element 

 which exists absolutely, and those which exist relatively. 



By its very nature, therefore, this ultimate mental ele- 

 ment is at once necessarily indefinite and necessarily inde- 

 structible. Our consciousness of the unconditioned being 

 literally the unconditioned consciousness, or raw material 

 of thought to which in thinking we give definite forms, it 

 follows that an ever-present sense of real existence is the 

 very basis of our intelligence. As we can in successive men- 

 tal acts get rid of all particular conditions and replace them 

 by others, but cannot get rid of that undifferentiated sub- 

 stance of consciousness which is conditioned anew in every 

 thought; there ever remains with us a sense of that which 



