THE DATA OF PHILOSOPHY. 147 



ing. These cases of illusion, as we call them, bear, however, 

 so small a ratio to the great mass of cases, that we may safely 

 neglect them, and say that the relative faintness of these 

 manifestations of the second order is so marked, that we are 

 never in donbt as to their distinctness from those of the first 

 order. Or if we recognize the exceptional occurrence of 

 doubt, the recognition serves but to introduce the significant 

 fact that we have other means of determining to which 

 order a particular manifestation belongs, when the test of 

 comparative vividness fails us. 



Manifestations of the vivid order precede, in our experi- 

 ence, those of the faint order; or, in the terms quoted 

 above, the idea is an imperfect and feeble repetition of the 

 original impression. To put the facts in historical sequence 

 there is first a presented manifestation of the vivid order, 

 and then, afterwards, there may come a represented mani- 

 festation . that is like it except in being much less distinct. 

 Besides the universal experience that after having those 

 vivid manifestations which we call particular places and 

 persons and things, we can have those faint manifestations 

 which we call recollections of the places, persons, and 

 things, but cannot have these previously; and besides the 

 universal experience that before tasting certain substances 

 and smelling certain perfumes we are without the faint 

 manifestations known as ideas of their tastes and smells ; we 

 have also the fact that where certain orders of the vivid 

 manifestations are shut out (as the visible from the blind 

 and the audible from the deaf) the corresponding faint 

 manifestations never come into existence. It is true 



that in some cases the faint manifestations precede the vivid. 

 What we call a conception of a machine may presently be 

 followed by a vivid manifestation matching it a so-called 

 actual machine. But in the first place this occurrence of the 

 vivid manifestation after the faint, has no analogy with the 

 occurrence of the faint after the vivid its sequence is not 

 spontaneous like that of the idea after the impression. And 



