CHAPTEE III. 



SPACE, TIME, MATTER, MOTION, AND FOKCE. 



46. THAT sceptical state of mind which the criticisms 

 of Philosophy usually produce, is, in great measure, caused 

 by the misinterpretation of words. A sense of universal illu- 

 sion ordinarily follows the reading of metaphysics; and is 

 strong in proportion as the argument has appeared con- 

 clusive. This sense of universal illusion would probably 

 never have arisen, had the terms used been always rightly 

 construed. Unfortunately, these terms have by association 

 acquired meanings that are quite different from those given 

 to them in philosophical discussions ; and the ordinary mean- 

 ings being unavoidably suggested, there results more or less 

 of that dream-like realism which is so incongruous with our 

 instinctive convictions. The word phenomenon and its 

 equivalent word appearance, are in great part to blame for 

 this. In ordinary speech, these are uniformly employed in 

 reference to visual perceptions. Habit, almost, if nbt quite, 

 disables us from thinking of appearance except as something 

 seen; and though phenomenonhas a more generalized mean- 

 ing, yet we cannot rid it of associations with appearance, 

 which is its verbal equivalent. When, therefore, Philoso- 

 phy proves that our knowledge of the external world can be 

 but phenomenal when it concludes that the things of 

 which we are conscious are appearances; it inevitably 

 arouses in us the notion of an illusiveness like that to which 

 our visual perceptions are so liable in comparison with our 



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