INSTINCT AND CONSCIOUSNESS OF FINALITY. 31 



We believe that this is not so. It is certainly im- 

 possible to determine in detail how the single instinc- 

 tive actions are performed and how they originated. 

 But the simple fact whether or not they proceed from 

 an intellectual or a merely sensuous principle or from 

 no principle of cognition at all can, we believe, be 

 easily ascertained. I^et us see. 



Our first proposition is that, as in the instincts of 

 man so also in the instincts of animals, the connection 

 of the action and its final purpose is entirely uncon- 

 scious; or as James says: "Instinct is usually defined 

 as the faculty of acting in such a way as to produce 

 certain ends, without foresight of the ends, and with- 

 out previous education in the performance. " 2 ) 



We are led to this conclusion first of all by the 

 perfect analogy that exists between the instinctive ac- 

 tions of animals and of man himself. For there are 

 many actions of man of an instinctive nature and per- 

 fectly similar to the corresponding acts of animals. 

 Consequently, if the instinctive actions of man are un- 

 conscious, the same must be asserted of the instinctive 

 actions of animals. The hungry babe endeavors to 

 suck, or gives expression to its feelings by crying, un- 

 til its mother has appeased its craving. It is evident 

 that these actions are appropriate to the purpose; nor 

 is it less evident that they are the result of instinct and 

 not of reason. But how? Is the babe conscious of the 

 final tendency of its actions? Does it cry because it 

 knows that crying is a means to induce its mother, 



2 ) W.James, The Principles of Psychology, vol. II. 1904, 

 p. 383. James' definition is incomplete, as we shall point 

 out below. 



