32 THE HUMANIZING OF THE BRUTE. 



to satisfy its hunger? Evidently not. For our own 

 experience proves that as children we were not con- 

 scious of the suitability of such acts. Moreover, the 

 supposition of consciousness on the part of the child 

 involves a contradiction. Its knowledge of the 

 appropriateness of the action would have to be derived 

 from nature or from experience or from personal re- 

 flection. The first assumption is inadmissible; for 

 there are no innate ideas. Nor can there be a question 

 of experience; for the new-born babe cries previously 

 to all experience of the result of its wailing. Nor can 

 we fall back upon reflection; for the child is incapable 

 of using its mental faculties. Therefore, the cry of 

 hunger is entirely unconscious. The same must be 

 said of all our instinctive actions even of those which 

 are performed after we have attained the use of reason. 

 Our consciousness offers unmistakable testimony 

 that we do not reflect in extending our hands or closing 

 our eyes on the sudden and unexpected approach of a 

 dangerous object. This fact leads to the inference 

 that animals, likewise, have not the remotest idea of 

 the appropriateness of their instinctive activity. 



But here we are confronted by some who reject this 

 conclusion from analogy and entirely disregard the 

 fact, that it is the only way of gaining insight into the 

 functions of the animal soul. 



It is under the influence of this opinion that Pro- 

 fessor Ziegler writes in his treatise on the nature of 

 instinct: "We must leave aside the notion of con- 

 sciousness, if we wish to acquire a useful concept of 

 instinct. ' ' For, ' 'who can tell whether a dog, a lizard, 

 a fish, a beetle, a snail, a worm act consciously or un- 



