34 THE HUMANIZING OF THE BRUTE. 



Romanes is correct in insisting upon this analogy. 

 For from like effects we may and must conclude to like 

 causes, and consequently it is sound logic to maintain 

 that, if two actions have the same manifestation in man 

 and animal, they must be similar in their nature. He 

 who denies this principle can make no statement on 

 animal instinct, since by internal experience he is ac- 

 quainted only with his own instinctive actions, whilst 

 he has no knowledge whatever of their nature in other 

 men, much less in animals. 



But we may go still further than Romanes. We 

 need not compare the instinctive actions of man and 

 animal in every respect, but may restrict our present 

 consideration for instance to the manifestation of con- 

 sciousness of finality. Now human psychology fur- 

 nishes us with a number of data taken from circum- 

 stances which clearly demonstrate that the actions in 

 question cannot possibly involve any cognition of final 

 tendency as such. Hence, if we can show the pres- 

 ence of the same identical data in the instinctive ac- 

 tions of animals, we have a perfect analogy and hence 

 a reliable conclusion. 



Our first argument in support of this statement is 

 taken from the very performance of instinctive actions 

 on the parts of animals. 



Let us return to the illustration taken from the 

 larva of Sitaris humeralis. Whence does it know 

 that in its first larval stage it can live only on the egg of 

 a bee? Whence is it aware that it may indeed start out 

 on its trip on the back of the male, but must in the 

 course of it pass over to the female bee and finally 

 glide down upon the egg? Whence does it know that 



