CHAPTER IV. 

 Instinct and Sensuous Cognition. 



IN the preceding chapter we have proved that, in 

 spite of their eminent appropriate ness, the instinct- 

 ive actions of animals do not betray the slightest trace 

 of consciousness of finality. But we are not allowed 

 to infer that all unconscious actions which manifest a 

 final purpose have to be classified as instinctive. If this 

 conclusion were legitimate, many vegetative processes 

 and vital actions which are merely automatic would 

 have to be referred to the domain of instinct. In 

 fact, some scientists admit a so-called organic instinct. 

 But at the very first glance it is evident that the term 

 is not used in its proper meaning. Or is the action of 

 plants instinctive, when they take in sap by their roots 

 or carbon-dioxide by their leaves? This would be as 

 incorrect as to maintain that the beat of the heart and 

 the respiration of the lungs are guided by instinct. 

 For, neither vegetative processes nor reflexive activit- 

 ies can be termed instinctive actions, but only such as 

 are connected with sensuous cognition and appetency. 

 Now, first of all, there can be no doubt of the fact that 

 instinctive actions are at least in some way determined 

 by sensitive cognition. For as experience shows, ani- 

 mals distinguish very well in their instinctive actions 

 between the different objects that surround them and 

 administer to their wants. Birds never take the insects 

 which supply their food for the material out of which 



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