INSTINCT AND SENSE-EXPERIENCE. 57 



is uncalled for. If, then, our wasp is wont to build 

 its -house of loam in a hollow tree, this act is not de- 

 termined by an innate representation of this or that 

 tree, but by an instinctive faculty which enables the 

 wasp, unconsciously, to combine with its impulse to 

 build a nest the representation of any hollow tree. 

 Otherwise we would have to assume that an immense 

 "picture-gallery" of all possible kinds of hollow trees 

 pre-existed in the soul and ganglion centres of the 

 wasp. For these wasps do not restrict their nest-build- 

 ing to trees of a special shape and form, but select 

 any trees that seem fit for the purpose. It is 

 evident that the wasp's action in selecting chimneys, 

 where they are to be found, must be explained by the 

 very same psychological laws which influence the se- 

 lection of a hollow tree where no more convenient 

 object is to be met with. For, if the wasp has the instinc- 

 tive faculty of combining the sensuous perception of any 

 appropriate object with the corresponding sensitive im- 

 pulse, why should this faculty not suffice for selecting 

 any other appropriate place instead of a tree? Indeed, 

 the only difference between the two actions lies in 

 this, that the perception of a chimney is more readily 

 combined with the respective instinctive impulse than 

 the perception of a hollow tree. 



Consequently, the wasp's second action, which is 

 modified by sensuous experience, belongs equally to 

 the domain of instinct, and the above-mentioned cri- 

 terion does not express the real difference between in- 

 stinctive and intelligent activity. 1 ) 



*) The following examples illustrate the same conclusion: 

 Everybody admits that children instinctively shrink from a 



