66 THK HUMANIZING OK THE BRUTE. 



of finality raises these actions to the level of intelli- 

 gence. It would, therefore, be a quixotic fight 

 against wind-mills to prove that the essence of an in- 

 telligent action demands the consciousness of its final- 

 ity. No, the question at issue reaches much further. 

 Wasmann lodges the complaint against Romanes, 

 that he claims intelligence for all actions of animals 

 that are based on sensuous experience, although he 

 simultaneously acknowledges that intelligence con- 

 sists in the power of drawing logical conclusions. 



Wheeler, too, as we have seen, makes "intelli- 

 gence" dependent on manifestations of ''choice" and 

 Peckham declares that intelligence is the power which 

 "enables an insect to seek, accept, refuse, choose, 

 to decline to make use of this or to turn to account 

 some other thing. " l ) But both Wheeler and Peckham 

 maintain at the same time that modification in con- 

 sequence of sense-experience renders instinctive ac- 

 tions intelligent. It is this deplorable contradiction 

 which touches the vital point in the argumentation of 

 eve n the most moderate defenders of animal intelli- 

 gence. 



They consider consciousness of purpose as inseparable 

 from ///e utilization of experience; wherever there is 

 sensuous]experience there is consciousness of purpose, 

 and vice -versa. Their criterion states that every ac- 

 tion is intelligent that is appropriately modified by any 

 kind of experience; and still they insist on the con- 

 sciousness of final tendency as the real essence of in- 

 telligent activity. Hence in their view the appropriate 

 modification of an action by experience and conscious- 



'; 1. c., p. 231. 



