INSTINCT AND INTELLIGENCE. 69 



any difficulty in admitting our argument. But our 

 way s separate , when we put the question : Is a sensitive 

 power of cognition able to form general notions or not? 



To answer this question we must first of all inquire 

 into the nature of a universal idea and investigate its 

 main difference from a so-called common phantasm. 

 When Clarke 1 ) calls the distinction between the 

 abstract idea and the common phantasm of the imag- 

 ination "the very touchstone of a philosophical sys- 

 tem", he enunciates a truth that is of paramount im- 

 portance in our present investigation. Everywhere in 

 the writings of those who defend animal intelligence, 

 abstract ideas and common phantasms are essentially 

 alike or, at the most, described as different degrees of one 

 and the same faculty of abstraction. Dr. Forel even 

 calls a universal idea "a general sensory idea" "like 

 the idea 'ant enemy" 2 ); and L,add, who is one of 

 the least offenders in most of his philosophical views, 

 deplores the fact that "much confusion has always 

 arisen in psychological discussion on account of the 

 very natural use of the word 'idea' for both the con- 

 crete sensuous image and the concept or product oi 

 thought" 3 ). 



What, then, is a common phantasm? 



When, before sunrise, a fisherman unmoors his 

 boat in the pleasant anticipation of a rich haul, his 

 imagination is naturally enough occupied with the 

 picture of a fine fish. In spite of the general resem- 



*) Richard F. Clarke, S.J., Logic, ed. 3., p. 123. 



2 ) Ants and Some other Insects, (Religion of Science 

 Library) No. 56, p. 22. 



3 ) 1. c., p. 378. 



