INSTINCT AND INTELLIGENCE. 71 



phantasm, rendered so vague and indistinct by the 

 separation from it of its distinguishing characteristics 

 that it will stand just as well, or just as badly, for one 

 individual as another". x ) 



The case is -very different with universal ideas. It 

 is true, that they are so closely connected with com- 

 mon phantasms that we are unable to form a universal 

 idea without beginning with the perception of the 

 senses and without being accompanied in our mental 

 activity by phantasms of the imagination. Nor do we 

 deny that the common phantasm by a kind of analog- 

 ous universality bears some resemblance to the corres- 

 ponding universal idea. Nevertheless, they are very 

 different in their real nature. 



In what does this difference consist? 



As every one concedes, the propositions: "the 

 angles of a triangle are equal to two right angles, the 

 cow belongs to the vertebrates, man is mortal," in- 

 volve universal ideas. For when pronouncing these 

 truths we do not restrict them to any particular trian- 

 gle or cow or man, but to all triangles, cows and men 

 without exception and in the very same sense. Now, 

 what must and what must not be attributed to these 

 universal ideas, in as far as they are opposed to the 

 corresponding common phantasms? To say nothing 

 of less important distinctions, as the sharp and precise 

 clearness of the idea and the vague obscurity of the 

 common phantasm, the -main difference lies in the 

 fact, that the universal idea is really and essentially 

 universal and free from, any definite extension^ whilst 

 the common phantasm, even when it is so "universal" 



) Clarke, 1. c., p. 137. 



