INSTINCT AND INTELLIGENCE. 75 



In other words: A sensuous faculty is by its very 

 nature extended, and can represent only extended ob- 

 jects. But universal ideas as such are completely inde- 

 pendent of every vestige of definite extension. There- 

 fore^ a sensuous faculty is imable to form general ideas. 



What is the necessary conclusion? 



Perhaps that there are no universal ideas? But the 

 foregoing explanations prove that this is absurd. 

 With logical necessity, therefore, and not because 

 "some peculiar bias has influenced our philosophical 

 views", we have to assert that any one who is able to 

 form universal ideas by abstraction must be endowed 

 with a faculty which trancends the power of the senses, 

 with a faculty capable of representing inextended ob- 

 jects, and extended ones in an inextended manner. In 

 other words, the cognition of universal ideas is insep 

 arably connected with a supersensuous , immaterial, 

 spiritual intellect. 



Perhaps many an adversary will reject this conclu- 

 sion, because it leads with inevitable necessity to the 

 acknowledgment of a spiritual soul in man, which, 

 even in the eyes of so eminent a scientist as Emery, is 

 a mysterious being, whose existence man may recog- 

 nize or deny, according to his views of the universe 

 and of the nature of man. 



But, if a spiritual faculty is necessary to form uni- 

 versal ideas, it is equally necessary to act with con- 

 sciousness of finality; for, as we have proved, this con- 

 sciousness implies universal ideas. Again, as "piir- 

 pose," supposes consciousness of finality, there can be 

 no action directed by ' 'purpose' ' without a spiritual 



