112 THE HUMANIZING OF THE BRUTE. 



training, succeeded in analyzing the motions which 

 actually caused the clever answers of Hans. In fact, 

 he was able by mere motions and without putting any 

 question to make Hans perform anyone of his former ex- 

 hibitions. Prof. Stumpf concludes his criticism by 

 stating that the case of Hans is so far from proving the 

 intelligence of animals that it rather proves the con- 

 trary. For if not even the training powers and pati- 

 ence of a man like von Osten are capable of eliciting 

 the expression of a single concept from a horse like 

 clever Hans, then, indeed, we are confronted by a first 

 class proof in favor of the old and general opinion that 

 animals are devoid of intelligence. 



"The animal's self," as Thorndike himself states, 

 "is not a being 'looking after and before', but a direct 

 practical association of feelings and impulses. So far 

 as experiences come continuously, they may be said to 

 form a continuous mental life, but there is no contin- 

 uity imposed from within. " l ) 



This is the reason why animals have never invent- 



') At one place (p, 73) Mr. Thorndike has the following 

 very interesting sentence: "Perhaps the entire fact of asso- 

 ciation in animals is the presence of sense impressions with 

 which are associated by resultant pleasure certain impulses, 

 and that therefore, and therefore only, a certain situation 

 brings forth a certain act." If Mr. Thorndike would take 

 the trouble to study Wasmann's works, he would find that 

 this sentence, correctly understood, has ever been the doc- 

 trine of scholastic philosophy. Of course, he will blame that 

 philosophy for not being able to support its statements by 

 experimental facts just as he has furnished them. But is it 

 not strange that the old scholastic philosophers arrived at 

 the same conclusions as Mr. Thorndike, though they merely 

 relied on the simple facts of daily experience? 



