ch. i.] THE RELATIVITY OF KNOWLEDGE. 7 



Philosophically speaking, then, we must admit that, 

 whether or not the Atheistic hypothesis of a self-existent 

 universe be assumed as true, it is at any rate incomprehen- 

 sible. We can form no genuine conception answering to the 

 phrase "self-existence." For by self-existence we clearly 

 mean existence which is not dependent on any extraneous 

 existence ; which is not conditioned or determined by any 

 cause. The assertion of self-existence is the denial of causa- 

 tion ; and when we deny causation we also deny commence- 

 ment, inasmuch as to suppose that there was a time when 

 the existence commenced is to admit that the commencement 

 of the existence was determined by some cause ; which is 

 contrary to our hypothesis. In order, therefore, to conceive 

 self-existence, we must conceive existence throughout infinite 

 past time ; and to do this manifestly exceeds our powers, 

 i The Pantheistic hypothesis of self-creation is similarly in- 

 comprehensible. Self-creation, equally with self- existence, 

 excludes the idea of any extraneous determining cause. If 

 the passage of the universe from non-existence, or from 

 potential existence, into actual existence, were determined by 

 any extrinsic cause, manifestly it would not be self-created. 

 Nevertheless, to suppose that existence, after remaining for a 

 long period in one form, suddenly took on of its own accord 

 another form, requires us to imagine a change without any 

 cause, — which is impossible. 



Of the Theistic hypothesis, also, we must perforce admit, 

 that, whatever may be urged in favour of our accepting it as 

 a help to our thinking, it is no less incomprehensible than 

 the other two. In the first place, the creation of something 

 out of nothing is a process which we are wholly incapable of 

 representing in thought. In the second place, granting that 

 the universe was made from nothing by an external agency, 

 we are compelled to ask whence came this agency? We 

 must either admit for it another extrinsic cause still further 

 back, and so on for ever; or we must regard it as self- 



