8 COSMIC PHILOSOPHY. [pt. i. 



existing, in which case we are again brought face to face with 

 the same ultimate difficulties which attend upon the atheistic 

 hypothesis. For, as Mr. F. W. Newman observes, " a God 

 uncaused and existing from eternity is quite as incomprehen- 

 sible as a world uncaused and existing from eternity." Which 

 conception is the more likely to be true, I repeat, does not 

 for the present concern us. What we have now to notice is 

 merely the incapacity of the human intellect for realizing 

 either the one or the other. In spite of their great apparent 

 diversity, the atheistic, pantheistic and theistic hypotheses 

 all contain, in one form or another, the same fundamental 

 assumption. Sooner or later they all require us to conceive 

 some form of existence which has had neither cause nor 

 beginning ; and to do this is impossible. 



Nevertheless, in spite of the impossibility of conceiving 

 it, this fundamental assumption is one which we are com- 

 pelled to adopt, unless we abstain from theorizing altogether 

 upon the subject. For it is impossible to enter into any 

 inquiry concerning causation without eventually postulating 

 some First Cause. We are obliged to do so from sheer 

 inability to follow out in thought an infinite series of causes. 



Assuming, then, the existence of a First Cause, let us 

 inquire for a moment into its nature. The First Cause must 

 be infinite. For if we regard it as finite, we regard it as 

 bounded or limited, and are thus compelled to think of a 

 region beyond its limits, which region is uncaused. And if 

 we admit this, we virtually abandon the doctrine of causa- 

 tion altogether. We therefore have no alternative but to 

 regard the First Cause as infinite. 



We are no less irresistibly compelled to regard the First 

 Cause as independent. For if it be dependent, that on 

 which it depends must be the First Cause. The First Cause 

 can therefore have no necessary relation to any other form 

 of Being ; since if the presence of any other form of 

 existence is necessary to its completeness, it is partially 



