PEE FA CH. ix 



extravagant claim of Positivism to stand for the whole of 

 attainable scientific philosophy is, I trust, finally disposed 

 of when it is shown that a system of philosophy has been 

 constructed, out of purely scientific materials and by the 

 employment of scientific methods, which opposes a direct 

 negative to every one of the theorems of which Positivism 

 is made up. 



The phrase " Cosmic Philosophy," x by which I have pro- 

 posed to designate this system, has not found favour with 

 Mr. Spencer, who urges the objection that all philosophies 

 whatever may, in a certain sense, be termed "Cosmic," 

 inasmuch as all philosophies have had for their subject- 

 matter the explanation of the universe or Cosmos., In this 

 objection there would no doubt be much weight if any 

 alternative term could be proposed which should be ideally 

 perfect. As it is, I cannot but think that the alternative 

 term suggested by Mr. Spencer is open to a parallel objection 

 of at least equal weight. To the phrase " Synthetic Philo- 

 sophy," as a distinctive epithet, it is an obvious objection 

 that the systems of Aquinas and Hegel, and other systems 

 built up by the aid of metaphysical methods, might claim 

 to be entitled " Synthetic " as well as the system of Mr. 

 Spencer. So far as this goes, therefore, there would seem 

 to be but little room for choice between the two terms. But 

 when we look more carefully into the matter, the case is seen 

 to be otherwise. For not only does the term "Cosmic," 

 when regard is had to the implications of its primitive 

 meaning, convey all that is conveyed by the term "Syn- 

 thetic," but it further hits the precise point by which Mr. 

 Spencer's philosophy is fundamentally distinguished alike 

 from Positivism and from all ontological systems. For the 



1 This term was first suggested to me by Mr. Manton Marble, some four 

 yaars ago, though at that time neither he nor I could have appreciated it at its 

 full value. 



