ch. in.] TEE TEST OF TRUTH. 49 



tive truth." 1 Even so, reiterates Kant, in the introduction 

 to the Kritik, " to attempt to transcend the sphere of the 

 subjective is vain and hopeless ; nor is it wise to deplore that 

 we are 'cabin'd, cribbed, confined' within that sphere from 

 which we never can escape. As well might the bird, when 

 feeling the resistance of the air, wish that it were in vacuo, 

 thinking that there it might fly with perfect ease. Let us there- 

 fore content ourselves with our own kingdom, instead of cross- 

 ing perilous seas in search of kingdoms inaccessible to man." 

 Up to this point we may regard Kant as equally with 

 Hume the precursor of the modern philosophy of relativity. 

 In the above conclusions there is little to which Plume 

 would have objected. But when we come to examine the 

 Test of Truth set up by the two great adversaries, the point 

 of irreconcilable antagonism between them becomes apparent. 

 Though conducted with a wider historic experience, and with 

 more extensive psychologic resources, the combat was essen- 

 tially the same which had been waged in the preceding 

 epoch between Leibnitz and Locke. Hume had said : the sole 

 criterion of truth is uniformity of experience ; that to which 

 human experience has invariably testified, we are compelled 

 to accept as true ; though it may not be true of the pure 

 objective order of things, it is true for us, — true of the order 

 of things as presented to our intelligence. Kant, on the other 

 hand, distinguished between contingent and necessary truths ; 

 and asserted that while uniformity of experience is a suffi- 

 cient criterion of contingent truth, it is not a trustworthy 

 criterion of necessary truth. For experience, says Kant, can 

 tell us that certain phenomena always occur in certain rela- 

 tions ; but it cannot tell us that they must always so occur. 

 Uniformity of experience cannot assure us that two and two 

 must make four, or that two straight lines cannot enclose a 

 space. We cannot conceive that these things should be other- 

 wise, and we must therefore know them, independently o!' 

 1 Lewea, History of Philosophy, 3rd edition, vol. ii. pp. 471, 472. 

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