CHiu.] THE TEST OF TRUTH. 63 



relation between phenomena, is thus and thus; not that it 

 must be thus and thus. And any number of experiences can 

 only tell us that certain phenomena have hitherto always 

 occurred in certain relations ; not that they must always 

 and for ever occur in the same relations. Or, as Dr. Brown 

 phrases it, " Experience teaches us the past only, not the 

 future." Let us take as an illustration, our belief that every 

 event must universally and necessarily have a cause, — that no 

 change can ever take place anywhere without an antecedent. 

 This is what the Kantian would call a necessary truth. And 

 the Kantian would say, All that experience can tell us is, that 

 in an immense number of instances, and in an immense 

 number of places, every event which has occurred has had a 

 cause. It cannot tell us that in all future instances, and in 

 all places throughout the universe every event must have a 

 cause. To test such a belief by experience would require 

 that our experience should be extended through infinite time 

 and infinite space, which is, of course, impossible. Without 

 such infinite and eternal experience we can never be sure 

 but sooner or later, somewhere or other, some event may 

 happen without a cause, and thus overturn our belief. Never- 

 theless, we have such a belief — an invariable and invincible 

 belief. And since our limited experience cannot have pro- 

 duced such a belief, it must have arisen in us independently 

 of experience ; it must be necessitated by the very constitu- 

 tion of our thinking minds; and must therefore be universally 

 and necessarily true. Such is the Kantian argument. 



Upon all this it is an obvious comment, that, if the belief 

 in the universality of causation is an inherent belief neces- 

 sitated by the very constitution of our thinking minds, it is 

 a belief which ought to be found wherever we find a thinking 

 mind. It is hardly necessary to say that this is not the case. 

 Children, savages, and other persons with undeveloped powers 

 of reasoning believe in particular acts of causation, but not 

 in the universality of causation — a conception which is too 



