«0 COSMIC PniLOSOPHY. [pt. 1 



A necessary truth is one that is expressed in a propc sition 

 of which the negation is inconceivable, after all disturbing 

 conditions have been eliminated. 



A proposition of which the negation is inconceivable is 

 necessarily true in relation to human intelligence. 



This test of inconceivability is the only ultimate test of 

 truth which philosophy can accept as valid. 



Thus the uniformity-test of Hume and the inconceiv- 

 ability-tost of Kant are fused together in a deeper synthesis, 

 — the deepest which philosophy can reach. As Mr. Spencer 

 forcibly states it : " Conceding the entire truth of the position 

 that, during any phase of human progress, the ability or 

 inability to form a specific conception wholly depends on 

 the experieuce men have had; and that, by a widening of 

 their experiences, they may by-and-bye be enabled to conceive 

 things before inconceivable to them ; it may still be argued, 

 that as at any time the best warrant men can have for a 

 belief is the perfect agreement of all pre-existing experience 

 in support of it, it follows that, at any time, the inconceiv- 

 ableness of its negation is the deepest test any belief admits 

 of. Objective facts are ever impressing themselves upon us; 

 our experience is a register of these objective facts; and the 

 inconceivableness of a thing implies that it is wholly at 

 variance with the register. Even were this all, it is not 

 clear how, if every truth is primarily inductive, any better 

 test of truth could exist. But it must be remembered, that 

 whilst many of these facts impressing themselves upon us 

 are occasional ; whilst others again are very general ; some 

 are universal, and are unchanging. These universal and 

 unchanging facts are, by the hypothesis, certain to establish 

 beliefs of which the negations are inconceivable ; whilst the 

 others are not certain to do this ; and if they do, subsequent 

 facts will reverse their action." 



As this position has been vehemently attacked by Mr. 

 Mill, who hardly admits for the test of inconceivableness any 



