ch. iv.] PHENOMENON AND NOUMENON. 73 



the nature of the process by which intelligence has arisen, 

 we shall be enabled to carry much farther the reconciliation, 

 here dimly foreshadowed, between the great opposing theories 

 of the experieutialists and the intuitionalists. However 

 difficult it may be to realize that this apparently intermin- 

 able controversy is at length to be decided and passed over 

 as antiquated, like the yet longer dispute between Nominal- 

 ism and Realism, it will nevertheless be shown that this is 

 the case. It will be shown that the Doctrine of Evolution 

 affords the means of reconciling the psychology of Locke 

 and Hume with the psychology of Leibnitz and Kant, not 

 by any half-way measures of compromise, but by fusing the 

 two together in a synthesis deeper and more comprehensive 

 than either of them singly has succeeded in making. 



At present, however, merely hinting at these conclusions 

 which are by and by to follow, we must address ourselves 

 to a yet more arduous task of reconciliation, — the task of 

 reconciling our ineradicable belief in the existence of some- 

 thing external to ourselves with the scientific reasoning 

 which shows that we cannot directly know anything save 

 modifications of ourselves. We have to examine the theory 

 concerning objective reality which, along with more or less 

 important qualifications, is held in common by Idealism, by 

 Scepticism, and by Positivism, as represented respectively 

 by Berkeley, Hume, and Mill. And by characterizing, with 

 the aid of the principles now at our command, the funda- 

 mental error of that theory, we shall be enabled properly to 

 define the very different position held by Mr. Spencer and 

 adopted in the present work. 



Our argument must concern itself chiefly with Berkeley, 

 since the conclusion reached in dealing with his doctrine 

 will apply directly to the doctrine of Hume, and will point 

 the way to the criticism needful to be made upon the doc- 

 trine of Mr. Mill. Indeed, as Mr. Mill has well remarked, 

 there is a sense in which all modern philosophy may be said 



