ch. iv.] PHENOMENON AND NOUMENON. 75 



basis of all atheism. If by matter you understand that 

 which is seen, felt, tasted, and touched, then I say matter 

 exists : I am as firm a believer in its existence as anyone 

 can be, and herein I agree with the vulgar. If, on the con- 

 trary, you understand by matter that occult substratum 

 which is not seen, not felt, not tasted, not touched — that of 

 which the senses do not, cannot inform you — then I say I 

 believe not in the existence of matter, and herein I differ 

 from the philosophers, and agree with the vulgar." * The 

 "grin," therefore, with which "coxcombs" sought to "van- 

 quish Berkeley," revealed only their incapacity to understand 

 him. Nevertheless the antagonism between Idealism and 

 common sense remains, though its position is shifted ; as 

 appears from the expressions of a very able idealist, the 

 late Prof. Terrier, when he says that Berkeley sided with 

 those " who recognize no distinction between the reality and 

 the appearance of objects, and repudiating the baseless hypo- 

 thesis of a world existing unknown and unperceived, he reso- 

 lutely maintained that what are called the sensible shows of 

 things are in truth the very things themselves." 2 In this 

 mode of statement the antagonism between Idealism and 

 common sense is forcibly brought out, though the intention 

 of the writer was rather to insist upon their harmony. For 

 as the "very things themselves " which are known and per- 

 ceived were held by Berkeley, and are still held by psycho- 

 logists generally, to consist in modifications of our con- 

 sciousness, it follows that, according to Berkeley, the only 

 real existence is mind with its conscious modifications. 

 What common sense affirms is the existence of something 

 independent of our consciousness : but this is just what 

 Berkeley denied. 



Suppose now we grant, for the sake of the argument, that 

 the only real existence is mind with its conscious modifica- 



1 Lewes, History of Philosophy, 3rd edit. vol. ii. p. 284. 

 * Ferrier, Philosophical Remains, vol. ii. p. 297. 



