86 COSMIC PIIJLOSOPHY. [it. i. 



relativity of our thought, compelled to think of these in 

 relation to a positive cause — the notion of a real existence 

 which generated these impressions becomes nascent. The 

 momentum of thought inevitably carries us beyond con- 

 ditioned existence to unconditioned existence ; and this ever 

 persists in us as the body of a thought to which we can give 

 no shape. ... At the same time that by the laws of thought 

 we are rigorously prevented from forming a conception ol 

 absolute existence, we are by the laws of thought equally 

 prevented from ridding ourselves of the consciousness of 

 absolute existence ; this consciousness being, as we here see, 

 the obverse of our self-consciousness. And since the only 

 possible measure of relative validity among our beliefs, is the 

 degree of their persistence in opposition to the efforts made 

 to change them, it follows that this which persists at all 

 times, under all circumstances, and cannot cease until con- 

 sciousness ceases, has the highest validity of any." x 



We have now reached a point at which we may make 

 specific mention of the Scepticism of Hume, which is simply 

 Idealism carried a step farther, to the denial of the existence 

 of any subjective, as w r ell as of any objective reality. It was 

 easy for Hume, in criticizing Berkeley, to show that we know 

 no more of Mind in itself than of Matter in itself; since 

 what we know is only our states of consciousness. But 

 when Hume proceeded to argue that nothing can be known 

 to exist save the series of impressions or states of conscious- 

 ness w r hich we interpret as occurring in ourselves, he fell 

 into the very same error of inference into which Berkeley 

 had fallen. We may admit, with Hume, that we know 

 nothing directly save modifications of consciousness. Changes 

 of consciousness are indeed the materials out of which our 

 knowledge is entirely built. But there can be no changes 

 in our consciousness unless there exist something which 



> Spencer, Principles of Psychology, vol. i. p. 209 ; First Principles, pp. 

 J3-06. 



